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FEDERAL AND STATE CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS-
PROCEDURE AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND
WILLIAM E. MILLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of our modern and complex society has neces-
sitated a widespread appropriation of private property for public use.
The vital importance of present-day eminent domain is emphasized
by the staggering proportions of recent and proposed takings in terms
of the amount of land appropriated, its monetary value, and the
number of individual citizens whose property is affected. In the
Middle District of Tennessee alone--of course a small part of the
national total-in excess of 700 tracts or parcels of land have been
condemned during the past seven and one-half years for various
projects, including the Old Hickory Dam and Reservoir, the Cheat-
ham Dam and Reservoir, Tennessee Valley Authority projects, and
a number of others. For these lands, the acquiring agencies deposited
in court the approximate sum of $4,000,000 as the estimated value of
the lands and interests condemned, not to mention the much greater
amount of the final compensation awards. The Corps of Engineers is
presently engaged in acquiring lands for the Barkley Dam and Re-
servoir Project on the Cumberland River, and it is indicated that
approximately 1,450 tracts of land lying in the Middle District of
Tennessee will be required for that project. Of course, it cannot be
forecast with any degree of accuracy how many of these tracts will
ultimately reach the court for trial because of defective titles, dis-
puted ownership, or refusal of landowners to accept the price
offered.
One writer has taken the view, which is no doubt shared by many,
that land condemnation cases have assumed an importance to the
public and to property owners which entitles them to preference over
all other civil cases, in both trial and appellate courts.' Of significance
to the legal profession is the fact that the so-called "land condemna-
tion" case has now become commonplace. With the clarification of
pertinent substantive law and- the simplification of procedure, the
general practitioner is no longer reluctant to enter this lucrative
field, called by one of our distinguished visitors a number of years
ago the "dark corner of the law,"2 a corner which the practitioner has
*United States District Judge for the Middle District of Tennessee.
1. Wasserman, Procedure in Eminent Domain, 11 MERCER L. REv. 245, 272
(1960).
2. 2 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT-DomAIN § 248 (2d ed. 1953).
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in times past chosen to leave to the specialist.
Since my experience as a trial judge in land condemnation cases
has been exclusively in the federal court, this article is composed
largely of observations on federal law and procedure, with some
specific examples from my own experience in the federal court which
are not only of local interest, but which also serve to illustrate the
practical problems that arise in the trial and administration of this
type of litigation.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AM STATUTORY LAw
A. Nature and Source of Power
It should be helpful first to explore briefly the nature and source
of the power of eminent domain.
The power itself is as old as political society. It is inherent in
sovereignty, and does not depend for its existence upon specific
constitutional recognition. 3 The power has always existed under the
common law.4 More than one hundred years ago the Supreme Court
of Tennessee stated:
It would, at this day, be worse than useless to enter into a discussion
of the existence and extent of the right of eminent domain, and to prove
that it is inherent in this and all other governments. That is now well
settled, and admitted on all hands to exist in every state and country.
No one now questions the right of the state to take private property
for public use, against the consent of the owner.5
It has also been said that:
This power is inherent in, and essential to, the existence of all govern-
ment even in its most primitive forms. It was exercised by the Romans
in the construction of roads, aqueducts, and similar public work. Until,
however, the rights of the individual as against the state began to be
recognized, it was not necessary to analyze the sovereign power, since
every order which the government had the physical power to enforce
was valid. At the approach of modern times, however, the rights of the
individual began to be given more consideration, the existence of un-
limited and despotic power in the sovereign began to be questioned, and
the political philosophers of the time studied the recognized powers of
government and named and classified them.6
3. Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 581, 587 (1923);
Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878).
4. Kohl Inc. v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 376 (1875).
5. Woodfolk v. Nashville & C. R.R., 32 Tenn. 421, 430 (1852).




Certain powers of government are, of course, "named and classi-
fied" in our federal and state constitutions. And while we frequently
associate the power of eminent domain with the last two clauses of
the fifth amendment 7 and the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States,8 and article I,
section 21 of the Constitution of Tennessee,9 these constitutional
provisions do not create the power; they merely assure that the
power will not be exercised without due process of law and that
payment of just compensation will be made when private property is
taken for public use.
In short, the broad power of eminent domain may be exercised by
the sovereign, subject only to the constitutional limitations: (1) that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation, and. (2) that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law.
The due process clause is now seldom invoked, since it is well
established that constitutional requirements are met when the taking
for a public use is effected in accordance with statutes which provide
for "just compensation" and procedures which afford "the owner a
reasonable opportunity to be heard on the question of damages.' u
The principal constitutional question raised in condemnation proceed-
ings today concerns the meaning of the term "public use," and even
that question is becoming increasingly rare in view of the broad
scope of the term as delineated by judicial decisions. There are two
notable recent examples. In the case of Berman v. Parker" the
Supreme Court of the United States upheld the constitutionality of
the District of Columbia Redevelopment Plan. Under the plan, slums
and blighted areas were to be acquired, cleared, and then sold or
leased to private interests for redevelopment under restrictions
designed to prevent the recurrence of slums or blight. A principal
contention of the landowners was that the result would be "private
use" by the redevelopers instead of "public use." In rejecting this
contention the Supreme Court stated: "Once the object is within the
authority of Congress, the means by which it will be attained is also
for Congress to determine .... The public end may be as well or
7. "No person shall be . . . deprived of ... property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation."
8. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of ... property, without due
process of law ...."
9. "That no man's particular services shall be demanded, or property
taken, or applied to public use, without the consent of his representatives, or
without just compensation being made therefor."
10. See 18 AM. JuR. Eminent Domain § 4 (1938).
11. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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better served through an agency of private enterprise than through a
department of government-or so Congress might conclude."' 2 An-
other case worthy of note is United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Welch, 3 in which the Supreme Court upheld the right
of the Tennessee Valley Authority to condemn an area isolated by
a reservoir, but not flooded, in lieu of providing a very expensive
highway through mountainous terrain to give access to the severed
area. The taking of the isolated area, said the Court, was "for a
public purpose."
Legislative declarations are to be considered and must be given
great weight, but whether a proposed taking is in fact for a public
use, is, in the final analysis, a question for the courts.14 The test, so
far as the federal government is concerned, is whether the govern-
ment has the constitutional power to create and develop the project
for which the land is sought to be acquired. Thus, "If the Federal
Government, under the Constitution, has the power to embark upon
the project for which the land is sought, then the use is a public
one."' 5
Any uncertainty as to this proposition was removed by the
Supreme Court in the Berman case when it very pointedly said:
"Once the object is within the authority of Congress the right to
realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear.' 16
C. Statutory Authority
The exercise of the power of eminent domain belongs to the
legislative branch of government. Hence, authority for any public
acquisition must be found in appropriate legislation. The innumer-
able acts of the legislature extending to various departments of the
state, to municipal corporations, to private corporations, and even to
individuals, the authority to acquire private property for public use
have resulted in much litigation in the state courts concerning the
constitutionality and interpretation of the various acts. However,
since the Act of August 1, 1888,17 takings by the federal government
have not been frequently challenged on the ground of lack of
12. 348 U.S. at 33-34.
13. 327 U.S. 546 (1946).
14. Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930); Shoemaker v. United
States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893); United States v. Certain Real Estate, 217 F.2d 920,
924 (tliFCir. 1954); United States ex rel TVA v. Vogle, 28 F. Supp. 454
(W.D. Ky. 1939); City of Knoxville v. Heth, 186 Tenn. 321, 326 (1948);
Southern Ry. v. City of Memphis, 126 Tenn. 267, 281 (1912); Memphis Freight
Co. v. Mayor & Aldermen, 44 Tenn. 419, 430 (1867).
15. City of Oakland v. United States, 124 F.2d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 316 U.S. 679 (1942); Barnidge v. United States, 101 F.2d 295,
298 (8th Cir. 1939).
16. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
17. 25 Stat. 357 (1888), 40 U.S.C. § 257 (1958).
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statutory authority. That act empowers any government officer who
is authorized to procure real estate for public use to "acquire the
same for the United States by condemnation, under judicial process,
whenever in his opinion it is necessary or advantageous to the
government to do so.'u S Ordinarily, the acts of Congress merely
authorize a project or program in broad terms, leaving it to the
executive agency to determine what particular lands and interests
therein are needed. The Act of 1888 established as a matter of
statutory law that, except in those cases where Congress has specifi-
cally restricted or prohibited the right to condemn, 19 the power to
purchase includes the power to condemn.
20
D. Property To Be Acquired-Legislative and
Administrative Determinations
It is now axiomatic that the legislature may determine the neces-
sity of appropriating property for a particular improvement or public
use, and that it may select the exact location of the improvement. In
such case, the utility of the improvement, the suitableness of the
location selected, and the consequent necessity of taking the par-
ticular lands selected, are exclusively for the legislature to determine
and the courts have no power to substitute their own views for those
of the representatives of the people.21 However, legislative enact-
ments ordinarily delegate to an executive agency or officer the au-
thority to determine what property is required. In such cases, the
question sometimes arises as to the finality of an administrative
determination in this respect.
The scope of judicial review of eminent domain proceedings is no
doubt extremely narrow. The Supreme Court of the United States
has said in all-inclusive and unqualified language that "when the use
is public, the necessity or expediency of appropriating any particular
property is not a subject of judicial cognizance. '22 The amount of
land to be taken is a legislative and not a judicial question.23 Neither
the extent of the estate nor the nature of the interest taken is sub-
ject to judicial review.24 That the legislative branch may delegate
18. The provision of the Act of Aug. 1, 1888, 40 U.S.C. § 258 (1940), re-
quiring conformity to state practice and procedure, was superseded by rule
71A of the FED. R. Civ. P. and has been eliminated from the code. Rule 71A
is discussed hereafter under the subject of "Procedure."
19. See, e.g., 64 Stat. 83 (1950), 16 U.S.C. § 577(c) (1958).
20. See Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 581, 587 (1923).
21. See the numerous cases cited in 18 Am. JuR. Eminent Domain § 105
n.8 (1938).
22. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878).
23. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 685 (1896); Sweet
v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 395 (1895); Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S.
282, 298 (1893).
24. United States v. South Dakota, 212 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1954); Simmonds v.
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to executive agencies the authority to determine what particular lands
and interests therein shall be acquired, though once questioned, is no
longer open to doubt.25 And in the event of such delegation, it is also
the accepted rule that an administrative determination of what
particular property is to be acquired is, in the absence of fraud or
palpable abuse of discretion, final.
26
In a number of cases in the Middle District of Tennessee, both
before and since my appointment, takings have been challenged by
owners who insisted that their property was not needed for the
project and that the administrative officials had abused their dis-
cretion in including such properties within the takings. As a rule,
these arguments have been vigorously advanced at some stage of the
proceedings, but in most instances they have either been abandoned,
or the court's rulings have been accepted as final. Two recent cases
of local interest involving questions of statutory authority and abuse
of discretion in which the administrative determination was upheld
have reached the appellate courts from the middle district. These
cases concerned the acquisition of the site for the present United
States Courthouse in Nashville27 and property for the capitol hill
development in the same city.28
Little was left unsaid in the Berman case on this subject of judicial
review of legislative and administrative determinations, as the follow-
ing selected sentences from the unanimous opinion in that case will
make clear:
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or
is not desirable.... In the present case, the Congress and its authorized
agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide
variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them. . . . Once the
object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through
the exercise of eminent domain is clear.... The means by which it will
be attained is also for Congress to determine. It is not for the courts
to oversee the choice of the boundary line nor to sit in review on the
size of a particular project area .... The rights of these property owners
United States, 199 F.2d 305, 306-07 (9th Cir. 1952); United States v. New
York, 160 F.2d 479, 480 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 832 (1947);
United States v. Kansas City, 159 F.2d 125, 129 (10th Cir. 1946); United
States v. 6.74 Acres of Land, 148 F.2d 618, 620 (5th Cir. 1945); United States
v. Meyer, 113 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 706 (1940).
25. See notes 19, 20 supra.
26. Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 709 (1923); Joslin
Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 678 (1923); Bragg v. Weaver,
251 U.S. 57, 58 (1919); Sears v. City of Akron, 246 U.S. 242, 251 (1918); Bar-
nidge v. United States, 101 F.2d 295, 299 (8th Cir. 1939); Department of High-
ways v. Stepp, 150 Tenn. 682, 687 (1924); Williamson County v. Franklin &
Spring Hill Turnpike Co., 143 Tenn. 628, 647 (1920).
27. United States v. Certain Real Estate Lying on the South Side of Broad
Street, 217 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1954).
28. Starr v. Nashville Housing Authority, 145 F. Supp. 498 (M.D. Tenn.
1956), affd, 354 U.S. 916 (1957).
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are satisfied when they receive that just compensation which the Fifth
Amendment exacts as the price of the taking.29
The propositions which I have discussed up to this point are rather
fundamental and are reaching the courts with increasing rarity. Yet
it has been my observation, both in practice and from the bench, that
they continue to perplex the attorney who is entering the field of
eminent domain for the first time, with the result that much time
and expense are wasted in litigation over principles that are no
longer open to debate.
III. PROCEDURE
A. Rule 71A
Rule 71A of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which became
effective on August 1, 1951, revolutionized condemnation practice in
the federal courts by abolishing the requirement of conformity to
state practices and procedures previously imposed by the Conformity
Act30 and substituting a uniform procedure in all cases except where
Congress has established a special tribunal for the determination of
the issue of just compensation. Due to the importance of this rule,
we should consider it in some detail. Before the adoption of the
rule federal condemnation practice was a hodgepodge of diverse
state practices and procedures. It was stated in 1931 that there were
269 judicial procedures and 56 nonjudicial or administrative proced-
ures governing condemnation proceedings throughout the United
States. According to a study in 1949, it was thought that this number
had not been reduced.3 1 Transition to the new rule has been ac-
complished in the Middle District of Tennessee with very little con-
fusion, and has been generally received as a constructive and workable
improvement in procedure.
Subsection (c) provides for a short form of complaint and prescribes
its contents.3 2 A model form of complaint is appended to the rule.33
Several innovations are introduced by subsection (d). Instead of the
defendant being served initially by a summons, 34 he is served with a
notice.35 The notice must contain a brief description of the action
29. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-36 (1954). (Emphasis added.)
30. 25 Stat. 357 (1888).
31. FIRST REPORT OF JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF MICHIGAN § 46, at 55-56 (1931);
Clark, The Proposed Condemnation Rule, 10 Omo ST. L.J. 1 (1949). See
also the notes of the advisory committee following rule 71A of the FED. R.
Civ. P.
32. Cf. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1404, -1530 (1956).
33. Form 29, App. of Forms, FED. R. Civ. P.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) requires that a copy of the complaint be served
upon a defendant along with the summons.
35. Cf. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1405, -1530 (1956).
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sufficient to inform the defendant of what interest is being taken,
the authority for the taking, the use for which the property is being
taken, the steps which he may take to protect his interest, and the
name of the plaintiff's attorney together with an address in the
district within which the property is located where such attorney
may be served. A model form of notice is also appended to the rule.30
Delivery and service of the notice (but without copies of the com-
plaint) are accomplished in the manner prescribed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for a summons3 7 and the effect is the same.
Service by publication is required in the case of unknown owners or
where the defendant's place of residence is unknown, and the pro-
cedure for publication specified in the rule is similar to that provided
in the Tennessee Code.38 Another innovation introduced by subsec-
tion (d) is that personal service may be made upon any defendant
"who resides within the United States or its territories or insular
possessions and whose residence is known," thus abrogating for
condemnation cases the usual geographical restrictions upon service
of process.
The only responsive pleading contemplated is an answer of the
defendant. Under subsection (e), any objections to the taking must
be stated by the answer, which must be filed within twenty days
after service of the notice, or they are waived. But that is the only
purpose for filing an answer. If a defendant has no objection or
defense to the taking of his property, he may serve a simple notice
of appearance designating the property in which he claims an interest,
and he is thereafter entitled to receive notice of all proceedings
affecting it. Even though he has not filed an answer or entered an
appearance, a defendant may present evidence at the trial of the issue
of just compensation, and he may share in the distribution of the
award.39 Liberal provisions are made for the amendment of pleadings
without leave of the court.
40
The provisions of subsection (h) which relate to the method of
trial are probably the most important and controversial innovations.
While the right to take is occasionally challenged, and the ownership
of the various interests in the condemned property is sometimes in
dispute, the great bulk of condemnation litigation involves only the
issue of just compensation, or the value of the property condemned.
The determination of that issue is the essence of condemnation pro-
cedure.
36. Form 28, App. of Forms, FED. R. Civ. P.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c), (d).
38. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 21-214 (1956).
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(e).
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(f).
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While 71A (h) is revolutionary and far-reaching, it contains only
one paragraph comprising four sentences. Parenthetically, it should
be noted here that the procedure under the Tennessee Valley Authori-
ty Act,41 which I will discuss later, is left intact.
Subsection (h) begins:
If the action involves the exercise of power of eminent domain under
the law of the United States, any tribunal specially constituted by an
act of Congress governing the case for trial of the issue of just compensa-
tion shall be the tribunal for the determination of that issue ...
In cases where there is no special tribunal or procedure provided
for, the rule abrogates the former requirement of conformity to state
law, and establishes a qualified right to a jury trial of the issue of
just compensation. 42 Subsection (h), following the language quoted
above, provides:
[B]ut if there is no such specially constituted tribunal any party may
have a trial by jury of the issue of just compensation by filing a [timely]
demand therefor . . . unless the court in its discretion orders that, be-
cause of the character, location, or quantity of the property to be
condemned, or for other reasons in the interest of justice, the issue of
compensation shall be determined by a commission of three persons
appointed by it.
It then provides that if a commission is appointed its powers and
proceedings shall be governed by certain provisions of rule 53 ap-
plicable to special masters. The subsection then concludes: "Trial of
all issues shall otherwise be by the Court."
Subsection (h), like the rest of the rule, has created very few
problems in our court. We have never had occasion to appoint com-
missioners under the rule but have always used the jury trial. Con-
sequently, we have not as yet been seriously concerned with the
controversial provision which permits the court, under certain cir-
cumstances, to submit the issue of just compensation to commissioners
instead of to a jury.
I am advised that the Lands Division of the Department of Justice,
which handles the bulk of the federal condemnation actions through-
out the United States, favors the jury trial and strongly opposes the
use of commissioners. It is convinced that a case is delayed instead
of expedited by the appointment of commissioners. On the other
hand, many district judges who have used the commission method
disagree. I have in my files copies of letters from twenty-three dis-
41. 48 Stat. 70 (1933), 16 U.S.C. § 831(x) (1958).
42. There is no constitutional right to a jury trial in federal condemnation
cases. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897); United States v. Jones, 109 U.S.
513 (1883); Welch v. TVA, 108 F.2d 95, 99 (6th Cir. 1939).
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trict judges who expressed their views during recent congressional
consideration of appropriation acts. Twenty-two of those judges favor
the use of commissioners in appropriate cases. The data contained
in these letters and the conclusions stated therein are interesting.
For instance, one judge, speaking of a single project in his district
comprising 3,000 tracts, observed that "with a small percentage of
settlements out of Court, a Judge spending all of his time trying
these tracts to a jury would devote approximately ten years of his
judicial life to the disposition of cases in just this one project. There
would, by necessity, be a long delay in the disposition of these cases.
Landowners would be required to wait several years at least before
receiving all of their money which would be a great injustice." An-
other judge, citing the acquisition of property for a single project
comprising 86,000 acres of land involving 10,000 separate ownerships,
stated: "Literally, if the question of each of those was tried to a jury,
it would have completely consumed the time of the four Judges of
this District for a great many years." The consensus of the judges
who have appointed commissioners under rule 71A (h) is that (1)
the commission method is more expeditious and less expensive to all
parties than jury trials, and (2) that commission awards are gen-
erally consistent, thus eliminating the wide disparity often found in
jury verdicts.
One of the purposes in appointing commissioners is to afford the
parties an early trial of the issue of just compensation in cases where,
because of congested court dockets, the number of tracts involved in
a project, or for other reasons, a jury trial cannot be had within a
reasonable time. This purpose, of course, is not accomplished if the
commissioners do not proceed with dispatch to conduct hearings
and make their awards. Consequently, it behooves the court appoint-
ing commissioners to keep informed of their progress and to see that
the proceedings are not delayed. We have had some experience with
this problem in the past and on a few occasions have found it neces-
sary to direct commissioners appointed in Tennessee Valley Authority
proceedings to file their reports without delay. It is our present prac-
tice in TVA cases to enter a routine order at the time commissioners
are appointed, fixing the time within which the award shall be filed.
This practice has operated successfully to expedite the filing of re-
ports, and as a result we have only two TVA cases on reference to
commissioners at this time. Questions regarding the possible future
use of commissioners under rule 71A(h) in our district must, of
course, await developments. But I do feel that the practice of making
indiscriminate, blanket references of all cases to commissioners is
open to serious question under the rule. The conclusion that must be
[ VOL. 141094
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reached is that a consideration by the court of the factors in each
case is contemplated, and that trial by commissioners should be the
exception rather than the rule.
The rule also governs actions in the federal courts involving the
exercise of the power of eminent domain under state law, provided
that "if the state law makes provision for trial of any issue by jury,
or for trial of the issue of compensation by jury or commission or
both, that provision shall be followed."43 Under the law of Tennessee,
the landowner has a right to a jury trial.44
Other provisions of the rule45 relate to dismissals, deposits, and
distribution of funds. They are short and clear and need no comment.
Costs are not subject to rule 54(d).46
B. The Tennessee Valley Authority Act
Because of the vast operations of the Tennessee Valley Authority
throughout this area, we should not overlook consideration of the
Tennessee Valley Authority Act with respect to its eminent domain
provisions. With some striking differences rule 71A (h) with reference
to the appointment of commissioners is patterned somewhat after the
Tennessee Valley Authority Act.
47
Under that act there is no jury trial; the appointment of a three-
man commission is required. Certain qualifications of the commission-
ers are prescribed and their compensation is fixed. Their powers and
duties are defined. Exceptions to their award are heard by a three-
judge court (unless the parties stipulate for a lesser number), and
such court passes de novo upon the proceedings had before the
commissioners. Usually, the hearing before the district court is upon
the transcript of the proceedings had before the commissioners; how-
ever, the court may, in its discretion, permit the introduction of
additional evidence. Upon such hearings, the district court fixes the
amount of compensation without regard to the amount fixed by the
commissioners. The provision that the district court "shall pass de
novo upon proceedings had before the commissioners" has been the
subject of some confusion. It has been argued in some cases that the
use of the word "de novo" requires the district court to try the case
anew, and upon such evidence as may be offered before it by the
parties, and not upon the transcript of the evidence adduced at the
hearing before the commissioners. However, it is now settled that
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(k).
44. Shook & Fletcher Supply Co. v. City of Nashville, 338 S.W.2d 237 (Tenn.
App. M.S. 1960); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1418 (1956).
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(i), (j).
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(1).
47. 48 Stat. 70 (1933), 16 U.S.C. § 831(x) (1958).
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the words "de novo" simply require the court to fix the value of the
property without regard to the award of the commissioners.
An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals within thirty days
from the filing of the decision of the district court, and the court of
appeals "shall ... dispose of the same upon the record, without re-
gard to the awards or findings theretofore made by the commissioners
or the district judges, and such court of appeals shall thereupon fix
the value of the said property sought to be condemned."
A basic difference between the Tennessee Valley Authority Act
and the rule 71A (h) is that the TVA Act requires the reviewing
courts-both the district court and the court of appeals-to fix the
compensation without regard to any previous awards; whereas, under
rule 71A(h), and certain provisions of rule 53 relating to masters
incorporated into the rule by reference, the court shall accept the
commission's findings "unless clearly erroneous. '48
Procedural matters not covered by the Tennessee Valley Authority
Act, such as service of process, form and title of proceedings, motions,
orders and judgments, which were formerly governed by state law
under the Conformity Act 49 (except on appeal, where the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure apply), are now governed by rule 71A and
other pertinent federal rules. But the specific provisions of the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority Act with reference to procedure were not
superseded by the subsequent adoption of the rule. For instance, the
Tennessee Valley Authority Act provides that exceptions to the award
of the commissioners may be filed within twenty days from the date
of the filing of the award in court; whereas, under rule 53(e) (II)
exceptions to the report of the commissioners must be filed within
ten days. Our court has held that in TVA cases the time within which
exceptions to the award of the commissioners must be filed is gov-
erned by the Tennessee Valley Authority Act and not by rule 71A. 50
Similarly, we have held that rules 71A and 53 (e) cannot be invoked
so as to require the TVA to pay for the transcript of the proceedings
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(h):
"Trial .... If a commission is appointed it shall have the powers of a
master.... Its action and findings ... shall have the effect, and be
dealt with by the court in accordance with the practice, prescribed
in paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Rule 53."
FED. R. Ci. P. 53 (e):
"Report....
(2) In Non-Jury Actions. In an action to be tried without a jury
the court shall accept the master's findings unless clearly erroneous.
49. See note 30 supra.
50. United States ex rel. TVA v. Cochran, Civil No. 1872, United States
Dist. Ct., M.D. Tenn., Nov. 3, 1955.
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had before the commissioners, and that such transcript must be
furnished by the exceptor.51
C. The Declaration of Taking Act
Neither rule 71A nor the Tennessee Valley Authority Act affects
the important Declaration of Taking Act of 1931.52 While this act is
substantive law, it has certain procedural aspects. Briefly, it provides
that when the government institutes a condemnation action, or at any
time before judgment, it may file a declaration of taking and deposit
in the registry of the court a sum estimated by the acquiring authori-
ty to be just compensation for the land taken. The amount of the
deposit is without prejudice to either party.53 Upon the filing of the
declaration of taking and the deposit of estimated compensation, title
to the property vests in the United States, and all title and lien
interests in the property attach to the fund. Thereafter, any deficiency
as between the amount deposited and the amount ultimately de-
termined to be the value of the property draws interest at the rate
of six percent per annum; however, no interest is payable upon the
amount of the deposit. On proper application, the court may make an
immediate distribution of the deposit to the landowners, and may
fix the time within which and the terms upon which the parties in
possession shall be required to surrender possession to the condemnor.
Withdrawals of the deposit are without prejudice. The purpose of
the act is two-fold. First, it gives the government immediate pos-
session and relieves it from paying interest upon the amount deposited
from the date of the deposit to the date of judgment. Secondly, it
gives the property owner immediate compensation for his property to
the extent of its estimated value.5 4 Such deposits are contemplated
by rule 71A (j), which provides that the condemnor shall make such
deposits as are required by law and may make a deposit when
permitted by statute, and that in such cases the court and attorneys
shall expedite the proceedings for the distribution of the deposit.
Although not required to do so, the Tennessee Valley Authority and
other acquiring agencies are following generally the practice of filing
declarations of taking simultaneously with petitions for condemnation.
My observations have been that those agencies have cooperated with
the courts and have assisted landowners in obtaining an immediate
distribution of the deposit.
51. United States ex rel. TVA v. An Easement, Civil No. 306, United States
Dist. Ct., M.D. Tenn., Sept. 9, 1959.
52. 46 Stat. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. § 258(a) (1958).
53. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 381 (1943); Garrow v. United
States, 131 F.2d 724, 726 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 765 (1943).
54. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 381 (1943).
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On the subject of the declaration of taking, there are certain Ten-
nessee statutes of interest. Tennessee Code Annotated section 23-
1507 provides that on or after the filing of a petition for condemnation
by a housing authority, such authority may file a declaration of taking.
Provisions relative to vesting of title, surrender of possession, and
determination and payment of compensation are contained in sections
23-1509 and 23-1510. These sections of the Tennessee Code are sub-
stantially the same as the Federal Declaration of Taking Act. One
provision, however, is radically different: The federal act provides
that upon application of parties in interest "the court may order that
the money deposited ... be paid forthwith for or on account of the
just compensation to be awarded in said proceeding." The sections of
the Tennessee Code referred to contain no such provision. On the
contrary, section 23-1510 of Tennessee Code Annotated provides:
"The money deposited into court by an authority shall be secured in
such manner as may be directed by the court and shall be disbursed
by the court to the persons found to be entitled thereto by the final
award of judgment of the court . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Taking
note of this distinction, the Supreme Court of Tennessee has held that
a deposit with a declaration of taking under these sections does not
stop the running of interest on the amount of the deposit.55
The declaration of taking acts, both state and federal, provide for
the deposit of a sum estimated by the acquiring authority to be just
compensation, and further provide that the court shall fix the time
when possession is to be surrendered. It has been suggested by some
who have had much experience in the courts that certain amend-
ments to the acts should be made. One suggested change is an
amendment requiring that the amount of the deposit be based upon
the opinion of an independent appraiser appointed by the court,
rather than upon the opinion of the acquiring agency. The advocates
of this change suggest that it would go far to encourage settlements
and thus eliminate expensive litigation. They reason that public
officials who are required to make unilateral determinations of the
amounts to be deposited would be less than human if their decisions
were not on occasion influenced by such considerations as the necessity
for keeping costs within limited appropriations, an honest but mis-
taken belief that their duty is to obtain the property at a minimum
cost to the government, and the belief that a small deposit will induce
the landowner to compromise for what is, in fact, a reasonable price.
And, of course, the landowner who is suspicious of the acquiring
agency's policies, methods and motives would more readily settle for
the amount of the deposit if he felt it were based upon the appraisal
55. Nashville Housing Authority v. Doyle, 197 Tenn. 555 (1955).
1098 [ VoL.. 14
CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS
of a competent and distinterested expert appointed by the court
rather than upon an appraisal made by a person selected and em-
ployed by the acquiring officials. Another suggestion is that the act
be amended to provide that before the entry of any order affecting
surrender of possession the landowner and parties in possession be
given notice and an opportunity to be heard on such questions as (1)
the right to take, and (2) the time within which and the terms upon
which possession shall be surrendered to the condemnor. It is claimed
that acquiring authorities sometimes misuse the authority delegated
by the act by taking possession long before the property is needed.
Conceding that these arguments have merit, the suggested changes
would basically reform the declaration of taking act. One of its
purposes as observed is to give the condemnor immediate possession.
To this end, the act provides that the declaration of taking may be
filed with the petition for condemnation. Obviously, that purpose of
the act would be defeated by procedural delays in the appointment
by the court of an appraiser, the actual appraisal and the delivery
of the appraiser's report to the acquiring agency, and the notice and
hearing on the question of surrender of possession of the property.
These proceedings could often require many weeks, and even months.
The suggested changes would require a full re-examination by
Congress and the state legislature of the declaration of taking acts
and the purposes for which they were enacted.
In numerous cases courts have stated categorically that adminis-
trative determinations of the estimated compensation to be deposited
with a declaration of taking are final and not subject to judicial re-
view. 56 Although such determinations are fundamentally legislative
and not judicial in character, the broad principle that when Congress
delegates this power to executive agencies and officials, their decision
as to the amount of the deposit may not be reviewed by the courts,
even for capriciousness or abuse, continues to be strenuously chal-
lenged. Recently it has been held in our court that a nominal deposit
of one dollar, made by the condemnor at the time of filing of a
declaration of taking against property admittedly worth many thou-
sands of dollars, did not meet statutory requirements. The con-
demnor's application for an order of possession was denied, and the
landowner's motion to vacate the declaration of taking was granted,57
whereupon the condemnor filed amended declarations of taking and
deposited additional funds aggregating in excess of $400,000.
56. See, e.g., In r'e United States, 257 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1958). Contra, United
States v. 44.00 Acres of Land, 110 F. Supp. 168, 171 (W.D.N.Y. 1953).
57. United States v. Certain Land and Interests in Property Situate in
Rutherford County, Civil No. 2453, United States Dist. Ct., M.D. Tenn., Nov.
7 and Nov. 30, 1957.
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D. Remedies of Landowner When Property Is Taken Before
Condemnation Proceedings Are Instituted
The Supreme Court of the United States has said:
Broadly speaking, the United States may take property pursuant to its
power of eminent domain in one of two ways: it can enter into physical
possession of property without authority of a court order; or it can
institute condemnation proceedings.... Under the first method-physical
seizure-no condemnation proceedings are instituted, and the property
owner is provided a remedy under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C., Sections
1346 (a) (2) and 1491, to recover just compensation.58
Thus, if the federal government, without instituting condemnation
proceedings, physically occupies or damages property in the lawful
pursuit of an authorized project or program, its action is a taking
and not a trespass. And since the landowner in such case has an
adequate remedy to obtain compensation under the Tucker Act,5 9 an
authorized taking cannot be prevented by injunction, 0 nor can
damages be recovered against the government's officers or agents
lawfully acting on its behalf.61
A distinction here is to be noted in the Tennessee statutes and de-
cisions. Tennessee Code Annotated section 23-1423 provides that if
land is taken and occupied for purposes of internal improvement
without the institution of proceedings to condemn, "the owner of such
land may petition for a jury of inquest . . . or he may sue for
damages in the ordinary way, in which case the jury shall lay off
the land by metes and bounds and assess the damages, as upon the
trial of an appeal from the return of a jury of inquest." The Supreme
Court of Tennessee has held that the above-quoted language "leaves
no doubt as to the right of the owner to bring an action in the ordi-
nary way, which can mean nothing else than an action of trespass
or an action upon the facts of the case to recover the value of the
land and the damages."
6 2
58. United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 21 (1958).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799
(1950); United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947); Jacobs v. United
States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); United
States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903); United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co.,
112 U.S. 645 (1884).
60. Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 (1932).
61. Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21-23 (1940).
62. Duck River Valley N.G.R.R. v. Cochrane, 71 Tenn. 478, 480 (1879). See
also East Tennessee & W.N.C.R.R. v; Gouge, 30 Tenn. App. 40, 203 S.W.2d
170 (E.S. 1947).
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IV. MISCELLA-Y
A. Order of Proof--Opening and Closing of Argument
For many years the practice in the Middle District of Tennessee
has been to require the condemnor first to introduce all of his evidence
in chief and to open and close the argument, even when the right to
condemn is conceded and the only issue is the amount of compensa-
tion. Questions concerning the order of proof and the right to open
and close the argument arose in numerous cases growing out of the
extensive land acquisition programs of the government for defense
and other purposes at the beginning of World War II. The then dis-
trict judge, in accordance with the state practice and procedure, and
on the authority of Alloway v. Nashville,63 Lebanon and Nashville
Turnpike Co. v. Creveling,64 and Eastern Tennessee Power Co. v.
Cleage,65 adopted that order of procedure. It has not been seriously
challenged during my tenure until recently. Decisions of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee handed down in 1943 and 1950 approved these
procedures which were prescribed in the Alloway, Lebanon and
Nashville Turnpike Co., and Eastern Tennessee Power Co. cases. 66
However, in 1953, the Tennessee Legislature enacted what is now a
part of Tennessee Code Annotated section 23-1418 (which deals with
appeals from the findings of juries of view), which provides: "In
all cases where the right to condemn is not contested and the sole
question before the jury is that of damages the property owner shall
be entitled to open and close the argument before the court and
jury." This recent enactment of the Tennessee Legislature is cited
in support of the view that we should change our trial procedure -in
the Middle District of Tennessee, in cases where the right to condemn
is conceded and the only issue is the amount of compensation, so as
to require the landowner, who has the burden of proof on the only
issue involved, to go forward with his evidence in the first instance
and to permit him to open and close the argument. Our court now
has this matter under advisement.
B. Scope of Direct and Cross-Examination
I will not undertake a discussion of the scope of direct and cross-
examination of expert witnesses; however, there is one point in this
area that will be of particular interest to the trial attorney. The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that since the sole issue on
63. 88 Tenn. 510 (1890).
64. 159 Tenn. 147, 17 S.W.2d 22 (1928).
65. 5 Tenn. Civ. A. 417 (1914).
66. Town of Erin v. Brooks, 190 Tenn. 407, 411-12, 230 S.W.2d -397, 399
(1950); State v. Rascoe, 181 Tenn. 43, 55, 178 S.W.2d 392, 396 (1944)..
1961 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
direct examination is the value of the entire property before and after
the taking, the witness may not testify as to separate values of lands,
buildings, improvements, etc.67 It has held, however, that on cross-
examination counsel may test the weight and credibility of the testi-
mony of such witness by inquiring as to how he arrived at his
estimate and as to how much value he assigned to particular elements
of damage making up the whole.
68
C. Conflicts in Statutes and Decisions
A canvass of the state law has disclosed some interesting develop-
ments in the statutes and judicial decisions. The following are ex-
amples.
State v. Rascoe and Town of Erin v. Brooks have heretofore been
noted.69 In State v. Rascoe, the court, following the Alloway and
Creveling cases held that the trial court did not commit error in re-
quiring the state to introduce its proof first. However, in Town of
Erin v. Brooks, the court, again citing Alloway and Creveling, held
that after the right to take is established or conceded the burden of
proving damages shifts to the owner, and hence the owner "must
proceed on the question of value and is entitled to be followed by
rebuttal evidence on behalf of the condemnor." These two cases are
readily distinguishable upon the facts but the dicta prescribing the
proper order of procedure in introducing evidence are in conflict. As
we have heretofore noted, an act of the Legislature subsequently
enacted gives the landowner the right to open and close the argu-
ment.7 0
In Maury County v. Porter,71 the Supreme Court of Tennessee
held that a provision in chapter 178 of the Tennessee Public Acts of
1951 that "no trial shall be had until twelve months have expired
after the completion of said road, highway, freeway and/or parkway,"
violated section 17 of article I of the Tennessee Constitution. Holding
that the doctrine of elision was not applicable and that the provisions
of the act were not separable, the court struck down the entire
act. Consequently, that act was not incorporated into Tennessee Code
Annotated which became effective January 1, 1956. Notwithstanding
this decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court, the legislature, by
chapter 216, Tennessee Public Acts of 1959, enacted what is now a
part of section 23-1532 of Tennessee Code Annotated, which provides
67. Fain v. United States ex rel. TVA, 145 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1944), and
cases cited therein.
68. United States ex rel. TVA v. 12.3 Acres of Land, 229 F.2d 587 (6th
Cir. 1956).
69. See note 66 supra.
70. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1418 (1956).
71. 195 Tenn. 116, 257 S.W.2d 16 (1953).
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that "no trial shall be had until six (6) months have expired after
the completion of said street, road, highway, freeway or parkway;
provided, however, that if the same has not been completed within
twenty-four (24) months from the filing of said condemnation
petition, said case shall be tried." On May 4, 1960, the Supreme
Court of Tennessee held this provision of the act to be violative of
the Tennessee Constitution. However, the act contained a separability
clause evidencing an intent on the part of the legislature that the
valid portions remain in effect if some portions be declared uncon-
stitutional. Consequently, only the unconstitutional provision was
elided.7
2
These examples have been cited solely for the purpose of pointing
up to the trial attorney the necessity of making a thorough ex-
amination of the latest statutes and judicial decisions.
D. Extent of Interest and Rights Acquired
The Tennessee Valley Authority apparently uses a uniform or
"stock" description of the easement and rights sought to be acquired
in practically all of its right-of-way cases. The rights condemned
are broadly described as a permanent easement and right of way for
the construction and maintenance of the line, and the right to remove
"danger trees" located beyond the limits of the right-of-way, with
a provision that the United States is to remain liable for physical
damage to the land, crops, fruit trees, fences and roads, resulting
directly from the operations of the construction and maintenance
forces. Questions concerning the rights of the condemnor and the
rights remaining in the landowner have presented themselves from
time to time in TVA condemnation proceedings. These and other
questions were raised in our court in United States ex rel. Tennessee
Valley Authority v. An Easement and Right of Way.73 In that case the
landowner filed a motion seeking to require the Tennessee Valley
Authority to file a more definite statement of the easement rights
taken. It was held that the description was sufficient, and the motion
was overruled. At the hearing of the motion both parties requested
the Court to instruct the commissioners regarding certain legal
questions in order to facilitate the presentation of testimony and to
aid the commissioners in passing upon the evidence. Because of the
frequency with which these questions recur, an order for publication
was prepared setting out in some detail the rights acquired by the
Tennessee Valley Authority under such an easement, the measure
of damages, and the future rights and liabilities of the government
72. Catlett v. State, 336 S.W.2d 8 (Tenn. 1960).
73. 182 F. Supp. 899 (M.D. Tern. 1960).
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and the landowner. This order, which has been published in 182
Federal Supplement, at page 899, will be of interest to attorneys
participating in TVA condemnation actions.
V. CONCLUSION
There are, of course, many areas in the field of eminent domain
that offer interesting subjects for study. In this article I have drawn
heavily upon my experiences as a trial judge and have attempted to
touch upon problems that have most frequently arisen in the trial of
several hundred land condemnation cases.
A continuous exchange of views will enable both the courts and
attorneys to improve our judicial machinery, to the end that speedy
justice may be afforded to every litigant-which, after all, is the
goal we are seeking to attain.
